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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PHYLLIS LANG,
Plaintiff- Appellant~
vs.

J. ROBERT LANG,
Defendant~

\Case No.
10225

SAMUEL J. CARTER,
Intervenor-Respondent.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF 'l.,HE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for a garnishee judgment against
a Utah resident who has been appointed by the California Court, executor of the estate of a California
decedent, and who holds money in Utah which the California Court has ordered to be paid to Defendant.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Plaintiff and Appellant, Phyllis Lang, obtained a
garnishee judgment against Intervenor and Respondent, Samuel J. Carter, executor, pursuant to Mr. Carter's answers to a garnishment duly served upon him.
Intervenor and Respondent moved the court to set aside
the garnishee judgment. The Court, the Honorable
Ray Van Cott Jr. presiding, granted the motion. From
the order setting aside the garnishee judgment Plaintiff appeals.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the order setting aside
the garnishee judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Pursuant to judgments in the aggregate amounts
of. $13,480.00, garnishments were issued, (R-1&2), to
Plaintiff and duly served February 27, 1964 upon Intervenor, Samuel J. Carter, both individually and as
executor, (R-3). Mr. Carter answered one of the garnishments, (R-1), stating that he had in his possession
$9,375.00 owing to Defendant, J. Robert Lang. A
garnishee judgment, (R-4), was obtained against Mr.
Carter and a garnishee execution was issued, (R-5),
and duly served upon him on February 28, 1964, (R-6).
On March 5, 1964, (R-20-6), Mr. Carter filed a com4
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plaint in Interpleader, (It-20-1), and served the same
on Plaintiff, (R-20-8). Mr. Carter stated that he was
appointed Executor of the Estate of John Lang, deceased, by the California Court, (R-20-1), and that
that court had made and entered its order directing
Mr. Carter to pay the sum of $19,500.00 to Defendant,
(R-20-2). Mr. Carter admitted, (R-20-3), that he
claimed no beneficial interest_ in the subject money
and that he had already· paid of tlus sum $10,125.00
to an attorney in Salt Lake City, one Wilford Burton,
at the direction of Defendant, (R-20-4). Mr. Burton
was joined by Mr. Carter as a party Defendant in
the Interpleader Action, (R-20-9), and moved to dismiss, (R-20-16). Argument on this motion was had
before the Ron. Judge Aldon J. Anderson, (R-13), at
which time Franklin Riter, Esq., representing Mr.
Carter, stated that the subject funds were in Utah,
that a final order had been entered by the California
Court directing Mr. Carter to pay the money to Defendant and that Mr. Carter was a mere stakeholder
and was therefore competent to institute an action in
Interpleader in the Utah Courts as a foreign executor.
The Ron. Judge Aldon J. Anderson denied the motion
to dismiss, (R-20-26) . At this point Tracy-Collins
Bank & Trust Co. was granted leave to intervene, both
in the subject case, (R-8), and in the companion Interpleader Case, (R-20-28). Intervenor, Tracy-Collins
Bank & Trust Co., maintained that Defendant had
assigned the subject money to it, (R-20-29), by instrument dated February 29, 1964, (R-20-34) ; this alle-

5
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gation Mr. Carter readily conceded, (R-20-37). Mr.
Carter then moved the Court to set aside the garnishee
judgment, (R-10), on the grounds that the District
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, had no
jurisdiction over him in his capacity as foreign executor,
(R-11). The Court, the Hon. Ray Van Cott Jr. presiding, granted the motion, (R-15). From this order
Plaintiff appeals, ( R-17) .

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
ONCE A DISTRIBU'.fiVE SHARE OF AN
ESTATE HAS BEEN ASCERTAINED AND
ORDERED PAID, THE PROPERTY MAY BE
REACHED BY A JUDGMENT CREDITOR
OF AN HEIR IN A GAR.NISHMENT PROCEEDING.
It is well settled that once a distributive share of
an estate has been ascertained and ordered paid, the
property is no longer in custodia legis and may be garnished by a judgment creditor of the heir. 4 Bancroft
Probate Practice 2nd_, Vol. 4, p. 504; 59 ALR 777; 6
Am Jur 2nd_, Attach. & Garn. par. 214.
Prior to the order of distribution, the general rule
is that a distributive share of an heir will not be subject
to garnishment while in the hands of the court-appointed administrator or executor. The California Court

6
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in Dunsmoor v. Furstenfeldt., (Cal.), 26 Pac. 518,
states the reason for this rule and the rule that pertains
following an order of distribution:
"The only reason assigned by the authorities
for the rule prohibiting the attachment of property in the custody of the law is that such attachment would generally delay and embarrass judicial and other official proceedings in the administration of such property and that this is a sufficient reason for the rule, as applied to all judicial
proceedings in regard to such property, is generally admitted; and to this extent the weight
of authority admits no exception to the rule.
But., according to a great preponderance of the
modern cases., there are some exceptions to the
rule applied to property in the custody of purely
executive officers., based on the maxim that the
rule should not be applied when the reason of
the rule ceases . . . (Emphasis Supplied) . . .
. . . When defendant has a right to a certain
distributive share of the fund in the hands of a
receiver, master in chancery, or trustee of the
court, the officer may be effectually garnished
by a creditor of the party so entitled, after the
court has ordered it to be paid.
"The authorities seem to concur in holding
receivers and similar officers liable to garnishment when they have in their hands a definite
sum to which the defendant or judgment debtor
is clearly entitled, and the officer has nothing
more to do with the fund than to pay it over.
Some of them may go beyond, but none, so far
as they have been examined, fall short of this
conclusion."

7
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The language used in 59 ALR 778 in noting the
Illinois Case, Bartell v. Bau1nann_, 12 Ill. App. 450, is
typical of that used by the courts in most jurisdictions :
"Subsequently to the decree of distribution,
each share is finally and definitely ascertained,
and a cause of action exists, therefore, against the
representative in his individual capacity in favor
of the distributee."
Wherever this point has arisen in the western
states, the courts have followed this line of reasoning;
thus the California Court said In Re Nerac_, 35 Cal.
392, at page 397:
"By the decree each share is finally and definitely ascertained, and a cause of action thereafter exists against the administrator in favor
of the distributee, and we are unable to perceive
why, on the score of public policy, or anything
else, the money thus judicially determined to be
due from the administrator to the distributee
should not be within the reach of the creditors of
the latter ... We consider it clear that, after
distribution has been decreed, an executor or
administrator may be garnished ... ''
Similarly, the Colorado court said in lsbell-l(ent-Oakes
D·ry Goods Co. v. Larimer County Bank & Trust Co.}
(Colo.) 226 Pac. 293, at page 294:
"It is said that the widow's allowance was in
custodia legis. Not so. It had been ordered by the
court to be paid to her, and the administrator
had no duty but to pay it. It was a debt from him
to her."
8
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And the Oregon. Court held in Harrington v. LaRocque_,
(Ore.) 10 Pac. 498:
- 1 ~;,_: ~ -~-·
"It may be considered clear that when the distributive share of an heir has been ascertained,
and ordered to be paid by the court, it is no
longer regarded as in the custody of the law.
The right to it has become fixed, and the executor
ceases to hold in his representative, but in his
personal, capacity. After distribution has been
decreed, it may, therefore, be garnished in the
hands of the executor."
In the instant case, Respondent, Mr. Carter, admits that he was appointed executor of the estate of
John Lang by the California Court, and that the court
had made and entered its order,. directing Mr. Carter
to pay the sum of $19,500.00 to Defendant, J. Robert
Lang. Mr. Carter further admits that he paid, of this
sum, $10,235.00-. to an attorney, Wilford Burton, in
Salt Lake City, Utah, at the direction of Defendant,
J. Robert Lang. On February 28, 1964, Mr. Carter
answered a garnishment under oath, stating that he
had remaining of the original $19,500.00 owing to
Defendant, J. Robert Lang, in his possession $9,375.00.
There is no qualification to the answer. It is therefore,
obvious that the funds held by Mr. Carter for the
Defendant were no longer part of the assets of the
estate of the California decedent and not in custody of
the law of the California court, but were the unconditional property of the Defendant and as such were
subject to garnishment by the Plaintiff. Indeed, as set
forth above, Mr. Carter admitted paying out of the

9
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fund $10,125.00 to a Utah attorney at the direction
of the Defendant. As a matter of fact, Mr. Carter
obviously feels that the Defendant could, two days following Plaintiff's garnishment, assign the balance of
the funds to the Intervenor, Tracy-Collins Bank &
Trust Company. It is indeed strange that Mr. Carter
would press upon this court the anomalous situation
that funds in his possession in Utah could be assigned
by a non-resident to a Utah attorney and a Utah bank
but could not be garnished by a Utah resident-creditor
of the non-resident Defendant.

POINT II.
FOREIGN EXECUTORS MAY SUE OR BE
SUED UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES.
The courts generally follow the law as stated in the
Restatement of the Law_, Conflict of Laws_, Par. 512,
p. 617:
"No action can be maintained against any administrator outside the state of his appointment
upon a claim against the estate of the decedent.-'-'
( Emphasis supplied) .
The rationale given is as follows:
"The administrator holds the assets of the
decedent which come into his possession subject
to the directions of the court which appointed
him, and is responsible only to that court. For
a court in another state to order payment from

10
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assets of the decedent in the hands of the foreign
administrator would be an improper interference
with the administration by the court in the first
state.n (Emphasis supplied).

In Wilcox v. District Court of Salt Lake County_,
2 Utah 2nd 227, 272 Pac. 2nd 157, this court said:
"We adhere to the principle enunciated in the
Restatement which appears to cover the case before us."
Respondent, Mr. Carter, and, indeed, the lower
court relied on the Wilcox Case for the blanket proposition that a foreign executor had no standing in the
courts of Utah under any circumstances. It is respectfully submitted that such is not the law. This write1
has noted that the cases following the general rule,
(Wilcox Case), are uniform in that at least one of the
following is present:
(1) The action is against the Defendant in his
representative capacity as executor or administrator, as in the Wilcox Case.
(2) The foreign administrator is sought to be
substituted for the deceased, as in the Wilcox Case.
(3) The foreign administrator is not personally

within the state nor personally served within the
state, as in the Wilcox Case.

(4) The property of the estate is not within the
forum, as in the Wilcox Case.
( 5) The assets of the estate are being attacked,
as in the Wilcox Case.

11
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In the subject case the proceeding is not against
Mr. Carter in his representative capacity as executor
of the estate of John Lang, but rather in his capacity
as a personal debtor to the Defendant.
In the subject case no attempt is being made to
substitute Mr. Carter as a party for the deceased.
In the subject case Mr. Carter is within the State
of Utah and has been properly served within the State
of Utah.
In the subject case the assets of the estate of the
deceased are not being attacked, but rather funds that
were ordered by the California Court to be paid by
Mr. Carter to Defendant, J. Robert Lang.
A review of cases following the general rule indicates that there is not a single instance wherein the rule
is applied to suits attacking a distributive share held
by an executor after a decree of distribution, for in
such an action a foreign executor is not acting in his
representative capacity in behalf of a foreign estate,
but as a mere stakeholder of the distributive shaire.
Even when an action is brought against a foreign
executor in his representative capacity and against the
general assets of an estate before a decree of distribution, the courts have allowed certain exceptions to
the general rule. For instance, ( 1) where a failure of
justice would follow if equity withheld relief, or (2)
where the forf~gn representative had put himself in
the position of an individual wrongdoer, or ( 3) where

12
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there was a res within the jurisdiction to be disposed
of or preserved, the courts have realistically excepted
the general rule. 53 ALR 2nd 325; McAndrews v.
Krause~ (Minn.), 71 NW 2nd 153; Allsup v. Allsup~
18 Tenn. 283; Cerrone v. Trans World Airlines~
(N.Y.), 148 NYS 2nd 162.
In Mc.Andrews v. l(rause supra_, the court explained:
"As a general rule, a foreign representative
in his capacity as representative of an estate may
not be sued in any jurisdiction outside of the
state in which he was appointed ... There is an
exception to this rule, however, when under certain circumstances assets are within the forum's
jurisdiction and the action is of an equitable
nature ...
"The Plaintiffs presently find themselves in
such a position that they would be unable to get
jurisdiction over Krause were they to commence
a proceeding in Iowa because he is a Minnesota
resident, and also because a substantial portion
of the assets are in Minnesota. Under such circumstances an equity court will recognize an exception to the general rule.
" ... In actions in equity, where it is necessary
to prevent a failure of justice, jurisdiction will
be assumed at least so far as the relief to be

secured relates to property in the jurisdiction
of the court.~
"The rule in Virginia is to the same effect.

Sylvania Industries Corporation v. Lilienfelds
Estate, 132 Fed. 2nd 887, 890, 145 ALR 612.
"'"Since Executor J(rause is a resident of Min-

13
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nesota and since there is property within the
state over which this state~ s power extends) we
_ hold- that the personal service of the summons
and complaint in this action is sufficient to enable the district court to acquire personal jurisdiction over him as representative of the estate
at least insofar as property in this state is concerned." (Emphasis supplied).

It will be noted that in the above case an action
was allowed against the foreign executor in his representative capacity~ against the general assets of the
estate within the forum, and before a decree of distribution; in the subject case the action is against a foreign executor in his individual capacity as a mere stakeholder against an adjudicated share after the court has
ordered the amount to be paid. There is no "interference with the adrninistration by the court" of California.
POINT III.
A FOREIGN EXECUTOR IS NOT A REAL
PARTY IN INTEREST WHEN A MERE
STAKEHOLDER. JURISDICTION IS OBTAINED BY STRICT ADHERENCE TO GARNISHMENT STATUTES.
As seen above, many courts have spoken of an
administrator and executor as having doffed his official
robes after the court which appointed him has ordered
him to pay specific funds to specific persons; at that
moment he becomes rather a personal debtor of that
person designated by the court to be paid by the rep-

14
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resentative of the estate. There is no contention by
Mr. Carter that he is other than a stakeholder or that
he has any beneficial interest in the funds which are
the subject of this case.
For the purpose of determining diversity of citizenship, Federal Courts have held that an interpleader is
a custodian or stakeholder of property and is merely
a nominal party whose citizenship does not affect the
question of jurisdiction; that the claimants of the funds
held by the stakeholder are the real contestants and
their citizenship and not that of the stakeholder determines jurisdiction. Cramer v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins.
Co. of Hartford_, Conn._, et al._, (8th Cir.), 91 Fed 2nd
141; Federal Reserve Bank v. O~maha National Bank_,
(8th Cir.), 45 Fed. 2nd 511. Similarly, Mr. Carter's
official citizenship as an executor in a California Court
does not affect the jurisdiction of the Utah Courts, when
Mr. Carter is acting as a mere s~ckholder.lStc_]
A garnishment is a proceeding quasi in rem_, 38
CJS 205. Moneys not in custodia legis and within the
four corners of the forum are therefore liable to a proceeding quasi in rem even without personal jurisdiction,
87 ALR 485. The statutory requirements in the subject
case were strictly adhered to as regards the service of
the garnishment and the subsequent judgment, and
therefore jurisdiction was obtained over the subject
money, regardless of whether or not the voluntary
answers of Mr. Carter to the garnishment gave this
court jurisdiction over his person, as held in Graha1n

15
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v. Hidden Lake Copper Company_, 53 Utah 230, 178
Pac. 64.
CONCLUSION
It is mete and right, that the law as we know it
have broad guidelines and general, well-established principles which to follow. However, in each individual case,
the court should search the interstices ofthe law as pertains to the set of facts before it. There are many well
known exceptions to the so-called hard and fast rules
of law, such as, exceptions in cases that would seem at
first blush to come under the statute of frauds. The
case at hand is one in point. The fact that Mr. Carter is
labeled a foreign executor does not change the fact
that he is a mere debtor of Defendant, having in
his possession in Utah money which he admits owing
the Defendant. Mr. Carter is able and, it would appear,
eager to pay that money to someone-someone other
than the Plaintiff. It is neither just nor equitable that
this court should co1npel a Utah resident to go out of
this jurisdiction to satisfy Utah judgments in a foreign
court when the money in controversy is no longer of any
interest to that court and in fact is in Utah and part
of which has been assigned to other Utah residents by
the non-resident debtor of Plaintiff.
The order of the lower court setting aside the garnishee judgment should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
DUDLEY M. AMOSS
..t-\ttorney for Appellant
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